{"id":45315,"date":"2025-02-26T11:22:57","date_gmt":"2025-02-26T10:22:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/?p=45315"},"modified":"2025-02-26T11:22:57","modified_gmt":"2025-02-26T10:22:57","slug":"with-a-new-german-government-incoming-the-implications-for-europe-are-substantial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/with-a-new-german-government-incoming-the-implications-for-europe-are-substantial\/","title":{"rendered":"With a new German government incoming, the implications for Europe are substantial"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Germany went to the polls last Sunday and the conservative CDU came first, followed by the far-right AfD. Upcoming coalition negotiations will ultimately determine the next government\u2019s composition, but CDU leader Friedrich Merz will likely become the next Chancellor, with the Social Democrats (SDP) as the probable junior coalition partner.<\/p>\n

The past 3.5 years were sobering \u2013 the \u2018traffic-light\u2019 coalition of the SDP, Greens and liberal FDP fell short of playing a constructive role in EU policymaking, despite having set itself an ambitious EU programme. Finding compromise in a tripartite coalition proved challenging and relations between France and Germany \u2013 already not in the best shape \u2013 further eroded.<\/p>\n

With the current geopolitical situation, the new government will have to show much more EU leadership than before. But whether they can deliver is another matter entirely.<\/p>\n

A new government better able to act?<\/h3>\n

Germany must abstain in the Council of the EU if there\u2019s disagreement among the coalition parties, dubbed the \u2018German vote\u2019. While this already happened under Angela Merkel, it significantly increased under the traffic-light coalition. Effectively, this means that Germany often blocks EU legislation, as under qualified majority voting (QMV), abstentions are counted as votes against. In cases like the Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), the Packaging Regulation (PPWR) or the European AI Act, Germany not only abstained but at times even reversed<\/a> previously agreed decisions.<\/p>\n

This has two ramifications: it makes it more challenging for other Member States to find stable majorities and it undermines the EU\u2019s decision-making culture by encouraging other Member States to behave in the same way.<\/p>\n

Many in the EU institutions and in Member States hope that the new government will be a more reliable partner. Merz has pledged to make Germany speak with one voice again. His government will likely be composed of only two parties, making finding common ground possibly easier. It also looks like he plans to make EU affairs \u2018Chefsache<\/em>\u2019, by giving the Chancellery a bigger say. This could be a positive development, as a united German voice is absolutely necessary for a united European voice.<\/p>\n

The relationship between Merz and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will also be essential to determining how constructive Germany will be in Europe. If the two leaders develop a good \u2018terrain d\u2019entente\u2019<\/em>, the next Chancellor could ensure that Germany is back in the European driving seat. Merz\u2019s plans to visit Paris and Warsaw on his first day in office, as well wanting to positively engage with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, will hopefully lead to better relations with European partners. Such strong, trust-based relationships will be essential for confronting an increasingly unfriendly US administration and to support Ukraine.<\/p>\n

What should we expect in terms of EU policies?<\/h3>\n

Unsurprisingly, security and defence dominated German parties\u2019 electoral programmes. The CDU manifesto<\/a> supports a stronger industrial base for the European defence industry, joint defence and security coordination, increased funding for the German military and continued support for Ukraine. Here, the CDU and SDP are likely to find compromise, even if (the departing) Scholz has shown a certain reluctance to send German tanks to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The essential question will be how far German decision-makers will be able to shake off their transatlantic attitudes following President Trump and Vice-President JD Vance\u2019s bombshell announcements<\/a> on Ukraine \u2013 and whether they\u2019re willing and able to provide security guarantees and funding for more European cooperation. Right after his electoral victory, Merz stated that Europe will have to become more independent<\/a> from the US, giving clear indications about his intended direction of travel.<\/p>\n

On the economy, the CDU manifesto is very much in line with the Commission\u2019s agenda, focussing heavily on competitiveness and suggesting that less red tape and deregulation will lead to a stronger EU economy. They advocate for the \u2018omnibus package\u2019 and favour rolling back some climate legislation<\/a>. While the SDP<\/a> also wants to strengthen the moribund German economy, there are some divergent views on getting there, particularly regarding Germany\u2019s investment capacity and the green transition.<\/p>\n

While migration featured prominently in the campaign, it was mostly through a national lens. However, Germany\u2019s repeated infringements of Schengen rules<\/a> could become problematic at EU level, and the hardened line on migration could lead to frictions with other European partners.<\/p>\n

One key question will be whether the new government is willing to reform the constitutional debt brake, which limits German debt to 0.35 % of GDP, thus blocking support for more significant EU investment. While the CDU\u2019s programme supports the debt brake, the SDP favours reform. Merz has shown openness to revising it, even if only for defence spending.<\/p>\n

But it remains\u00a0 a bone of contention, as recent discussions<\/a> show. At European level, the debt brake is important because EU leaders are preparing to negotiate some controversial files, such as the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the collection of EU \u2018own resources\u2019<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The last chance government?<\/h3>\n

Regardless of whoever forms the new coalition, it\u2019s likely to be heavily pressured by the AfD, the largest opposition party. It won more than 20\u00a0% of the vote<\/a> and heavily influenced the campaign.<\/p>\n

If Merz\u2019s government fails to perform, the AfD could potentially come first in the 2029 elections. The (already frayed) \u2018cordon sanitaire\u2019<\/em> might then finally break. How well the AfD fares will depend on the centre parties and, most importantly, the CDU. Merz attempting to win over AfD voters by proposing harsher new migration rules a few weeks before the election did not pay off for him in electoral terms \u2013 as seen in other countries, voters prefer the original brand. Yet despite the AfD-driven campaign focus on migration, Germany\u2019s economy over the next few years will be the decisive factor.<\/p>\n

Suffice to say, the pressure is enormous. While EU countries have grappled with high inflation and soaring living costs, Germany is also burdened with the collapse of its long-standing \u2018business model\u2019 \u2013 relying on copious trade with China, cheap energy from Russia and security guarantees from the US.<\/p>\n

Given the economic and geopolitical situation, Germany must clearly define its European policy objectives, look for common ground with its allies, showcase that it\u2019s willing to compromise and constructively liaise with its European partners.<\/p>\n

Above all, the next German government should recognise that its national interest lays firmly in a strong EU. A first opportunity for Merz to brandish his European credentials is the upcoming European Council meeting on 6 March, with outgoing Chancellor Scholz expected to bring him along.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Sophie Pornschlegel is Deputy Director at <\/em>Europe Jacques Delors<\/em><\/a>, where this commentary has also been published.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Germany went to the polls last Sunday and the conservative CDU came first, followed by the far-right AfD. Upcoming coalition negotiations will ultimately determine the next government\u2019s composition, but CDU leader Friedrich Merz will likely become the next Chancellor, with the Social Democrats (SDP) as the probable junior coalition partner. The past 3.5 years were […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53,"featured_media":45317,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"mc4wp_mailchimp_campaign":[],"footnotes":""},"tags":[],"class_list":["post-45315","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","topics-foreign-policy-security","topics-eu-institutions-policy-making","units-institutions"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45315"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45316,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45315\/revisions\/45316"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/45317"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ceps.eu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=45315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}